In dialogue with General Treatise on Semiotics , this new edition of Kant and the Platypus brings together essays written by Umberto Eco that deal with themes related to language and cognition.
How do we recognize a cat? How do we differentiate it from a dog? Why don't we confuse an elephant with an armadillo or call a woman a hat? This formidable problem has obsessed thinkers from Plato to contemporary philosophers, and not even Kant knew how to solve it satisfactorily. In Kant and the Platypus , Umberto Eco addresses these questions and explores the vague and fascinating field of cognitive science. "If there are many things I say in these pages, there are many more that I don't say, simply because I don't have precise ideas about them."
Written over the course of a year, the essays in this book stem from systematic concerns that refer to, complement, and engage with Eco's classic 1975 work, General Treatise on Semiotics . Instead of an academic analysis, Eco presents a series of investigations based on common sense, and his theoretical discussions are full of "stories," using fables to help the reader see the themes clearly.
But what about Kant and the platypus? From Kant—on whom the direction of cognitive science in this century depends, based on its dilemmas and axioms—Eco draws the empirical concepts that allow for a first nucleus from which successive definitions will be organized. The platypus, a mammal that for over a century failed to be included in any category of order or species, serves as a prime example of the difficulties of classification. It therefore serves to test the Kantian system, or the order of knowledge according to Kant; and also to allow us to imagine the philosopher's reaction to this animal he never got to know.
"In this book, I explain why the platypus is not horrible, but prodigious and providential in that it tests a theory of knowledge. Incidentally, given its very early appearance in the development of species, I suggest that it is not made from pieces of other animals, but that other animals are made from its pieces. [...]
The task of a philosophical discourse is to revisit where Kant started, and what problematic knots he wrestled with, because their alternation can teach us something as well. Without knowing it, we may still be children of his errors (as well as his truths), and understanding the subject could prevent us from making similar mistakes or believing we discovered yesterday what he had already suggested two hundred years ago. Briefly, Kant knew nothing about the platypus, and patience, but the platypus, to resolve its own identity crisis, should know something about Kant.